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TITLE VI: THE IMPACT/INTENT DEBATE
ENTERS THE MUNICIPAL SERVICES
ARENA
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1970's, beset by a severe budgetary crisis, New
York City undertook a series of actions to reduce expenditures and
increase the efficiency of its municipal services systems.1 As part of
this plan, the city's Health and Hospital Corporation (HHC) de-
cided to close Sydenham Hospital, a municipal acute care facility
located in a low-income black and Hispanic neighborhood.2 The
decision to close Sydenham appeared fiscally sound. Because of the
hospital's location, however, the HHC's proposal impacted dispro-
portionately on blacks and Hispanics. Therefore, in Bryan v.
Koch,3 a class comprised of local minority residents sought to en-
join the closing of Sydenham, claiming that it would constitute ra-
cial discrimination in the expenditure of federal funds in violation
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act).'
I Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 221 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). In
the 1960's and early 1970's, New York City's obligations consistently outstripped its avail-
able financial resources. Note, The Constitutional Debt Limit and New York City, 8 FORD-
HAM UPs. L.J. 185, 185 (1979). Faced with this fiscal deterioration, however, the city's offi-
cials failed to either raise revenues through taxes or to cut expenditures through a reduction
in services. Shalala & Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The New York Case, 1976 DuKE L.J.
1119, 1122-23. Therefore, by 1975, the city had incurred a budget deficit of between $6
billion and $9 billion, and was threatened with bankruptcy. Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. at
221.
, As of 1978, despite severe budget cuts in other municipal services, the HHC had suf-
fered relatively "inconsequential reductions in support." 492 F. Supp. at 221. Eventually,
however, the HHC was required to develop a program to eliminate its projected fiscal 1980
deficit of $60 to $80 million by reducing manpower costs and increasing revenues. Id. The
city's Office of Management and Budget concluded that this could best be accomplished by
closing entire hospital facilities. Id.
3 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980), aft'g, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act) was in-
tended to be a "constitutional and desirable means of dealing with the injustices and humil-
iations of racial and other discrimination," H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Seas., re-
printed in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2391, 2394, by "eradicat[ing] significant
areas of discrimination on a nationwide basis." Id. at 2393. In accordance with this broad
remedial purpose, the Act prohibits discrimination in such diverse areas as public accommo-
dations, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976), education, see id. § 2000c, and employment, see id. §
2000e, as well as in federally funded programs.
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Title VP prohibits discrimination on the ground of race, color,
or national origin in the administration of programs receiving
federal financial assistance.6 Traditionally, the statute has been
used by private plaintiffs7 and administrative agencies8 to remedy
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); see Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (4th Cir. 1973);
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Del. 1977). Section
601 of Title VI provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
It is settled that Congress has the constitutional power to condition receipt of federal
funds upon the recipients compliance with federal statutory and administrative directives.
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct 2758, 2772 (1980). This power derives from article I, §
8 of the Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall have Power.. . to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." U.S.
CONST. art I, § 8. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress may use the spend-
ing power to induce local governments and private parties to cooperate voluntarily with
federal policy. E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2765 (1980); Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1974); see II STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1019 (B. Schwartz ed.
1970); L. TRIME, AMERIcAN CONsTrrUmoNAL LAW 247-48 (1978).
I "Federal financial assistance" subjecting the recipient to Title VI includes grants,
loans, the sale, lease of, or permission to use federal property for nominal consideration, and
any other arrangement by which federal benefits are provided. UNITED STATES COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VI THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFoRT-1974: To EXTEND
FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSIST-
ANCE].
A "recipient" within the meaning of Title VI is "the intermediary entity whose nondis-
criminatory participation in the federally-assisted program is essential to the provision of
benefits to the identified class which the federal statute is designed to serve." Bob Jones
Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 601 n.15 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (5th
Cir. 1975). Thus, payments made directly to an individual, such as veterans' pensions or
social security benefits, generally are not covered by Title VI since they are not conditioned
on participation in any program or activity. See Hearings Before House Judiciary Commit-
tee on H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Part IV, at 2773 (1963) (letter from Deputy Attorney
General Katzenbach to Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Judiciary Committee); 110 CONG.
REC. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). See generally Note, Administrative Cutoff
of Federal Funding Under Title VI: A Proposed Interpretation of "Program," 52 IND. L.J.
651 (1977); Note, Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University: Defining "Recipient" and
"Program or Part Thereof," 78 MICH. L. Rzv. 608 (1980).
7 Section 601 of Title VI does not expressly create a private right of action to redress
violations of the statute, but a majority of the lower federal courts considering the issue
have recognized an implied private right of action. E.g., NAACP v. Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1257 (3d Cir. 1979); Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370
F.2d 847, 851-52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967). Two recent decisions of the
Supreme Court, however, have generated some confusion as to the viability of the Title VI
private right of action. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), it was
argued that the sole function of section 601 was to provide a statutory predicate for admin-
istrative enforcement under section 602. Id. at 282; see note 8 and accompanying text infra.
While the Bakke Court declined to resolve the question, Justice White, in a separate opin-
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a
discrimination in federally funded education,9 employment, 0 and
ion, stated that an implied private cause of action under Title VI would be contrary to the
legislative intent. Id. at 380-81. At least one lower federal court since Bakke has relied in
part on Justice White's reasoning, concluding that there is no private right of action under
Title VI. Clark v. Louisa County School Bd., 472 F. Supp. 321, 323 (E.D. Va. 1979). On the
other hand, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Court concluded
that the legislative history of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §
1681 (1976), showed that Congress believed it had created a private right'of action under
Title VI. 441 U.S. at 694-96, 703. Subsequently, Cannon has been interpreted as placing the
Supreme Court's imprimatur on the private right of action under Title VI. See Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, No. 79-7377, slip op. at 6151 (2d Cir. July 25, 1980) (Coffrin, J.,
concurring); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1257 (3d Cir.
1979); Brown v. New Haven Civ. Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (D. Conn. 1979); Note,
An Implied Private Right of Action Under Title VI, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 297, 308
(1980); Comment, Civil Rights: Title VI - Is a Private Right of Action Intended?, 19
WASHBURN L.J. 565, 570-71 (1980).
It is unsettled whether a private plaintiff can recover compensatory damages for a Title
VI violation. Two district courts have suggested that damages are not appropriate in Title
VI suits. See Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (N.D. Cal.
1979) (dictum); Rendon v. Utah State Dep't of Empl. Security, 454 F. Supp. 534, 536 (D.
Utah 1978). In contrast, three courts have suggested that a private action for damages might
be appropriately maintained under Title VI. See Flanagan v. President & Directors, 417 F.
Supp. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1976); Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 F. Supp. 842, 847 (D. Neb.)
(dictum), aff'd, 524 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1975); Quiroz v. City of Santa Ana, 18 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1138 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (dictum).
8 Title VI creates enforcement and rule-making powers in appropriate federal adminis-
trative agencies. Section 602 of Title VI provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract
... is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this
title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or or-
ders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the
objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with
which the action is taken .... Compliance with any requirement adopted pursu-
ant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or
to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom
there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a
failure to comply with such requirement ... or (2) by any other means authorized
by law- Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the depart-
ment or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the
failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance can-
not be secured by voluntary means ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). Congress may properly delegate such enforcement powers, since
any constitutionally granted legislative power implies a power to delegate authority under it
sufficient to effectuate its purposes. Lichter v. United States; 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948).
E.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
10 E.g., Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978), affd sub nom. Board of
Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 528 F.2d
508 (5th Cir. 1976).
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housing programs.11 Bryan v. Koch exemplifies the growing use of
Title VI to prevent discrimination in the provision of health care
and other municipal services.12 The utility of Title VI in municipal
services cases, however, remains uncertain. First, the requirements
for a prima facie showing of racial discrimination under Title VI
are unsettled. 3 Early cases1 4 and agency regulations set forth a
standard of discriminatory effect, whereby the Title VI plaintiff
may make out a prima facie case by proving that the challenged
policy impacts disproportionately on a group protected by the stat-
ute.18 Recently, however, some courts have adopted a discrimina-
tory intent standard. Moreover, municipal services litigation
under Title VI poses a sensitive policy issue: the extent to which
the judiciary may scrutinize and abridge the municipal decision-
making process in order to remedy discrimination.""
This Note initially will outline a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination under the intent and impact standards as they have
developed under the Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.19 It will then discuss the current conflict in the courts
as to the appropriate standard for Title VI violations. This will be
followed by an analysis of the legislative history of the statute with
a view toward ascertaining congressional intent. Bryan v. Koch will
then serve as a vehicle to explore the intent-impact debate in the
context of municipal services litigation. After a discussion of the
relevant policy considerations and Title VI precedent, the Note
21 E.g., Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974); Gautreaux v.
Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
1" E.g., Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp.
896 (E.D. Mo. 1979); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 280, 289 (D.
Del. 1978); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
" See notes 22-36 and accompanying text infra. The function of the prima facie case in
civil rights litigation is to "bring the conclusion of forbidden discrimination within the realm
of legitimate inference." Fessler & Haar, Beyond the Wrong Side of the Tracks: Municipal
Services in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 441, 447 (1971); see
Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VI Litigation, 11 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 128, 165 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Fair Housing Litigation]. A prima facie
showing of racial discrimination prevents a directed verdict against the plaintiff and, if un-
rebutted, enables the court to hold for the plaintiff. See Fessler & Haar, supra, at 447-48.
14 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 528
F.2d 508, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1976); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1970).
E.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1979).
16 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1979).
17 E.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980); see notes 38-41 and accom-
panying text infra.
18 See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d at 619.
'* 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
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will conclude that municipal services cases under Title VI should
be governed by an impact standard. Finally, the Note will suggest
the nature of the proof necessary to present a prima facie case of
racial discrimination in the provision of municipal services and the
scope of the defendant's burden of justification.
THE PRIMA FACIE CASE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: INTENT
VERSUS IMPACT
A legislative or administrative policy that is racially neutral on
its face generally will be valid if it is rationally related to a legiti-
mate public objective.20 When a facially neutral policy tends to
produce a disproportionate racial impact,21 however, the courts will
undertake a different inquiry. The civil rights litigation of the past
two decades has produced two mutually exclusive standards for es-
,0 See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). The "rational relation" test applies to governmental
acts or policies that do not affect fundamental rights or involve suspect classifications. Id. In
contrast, state action "impermissibly interfer[ing] with the exercise of a fundamental right
or operat[ing] to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class" is subject to strict scrutiny.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
The strict scrutiny standard imposes on the defendant the burden of showing that the chal-
lenged governmental action is necessary to advance a compelling state interest. See Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978). The strict scrutiny test, therefore,
has been characterized as "strict" in theory and "fatal" in fact since it almost invariably
causes the challenged action to be struck down. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term
- Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
" A government action has a disproportionate racial impact if it is detrimental to a
greater percentage of minority group members than whites, or if it more seriously disadvan-
tages minority group members than whites. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 541 n.3 (1977). Disproportionate impact may
arise from the underrepresentation of minorities in proportion to their numbers in the gen-
eral population, see Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 36, 40 (1977), from employment selection
criteria that exclude a greater percentage of minorities than whites, see Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), from official action having a greater adverse economic
effect on minority groups than whites, see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1972)
(cutback in welfare benefits), or from an unequal allocation of certain civil rights between
minority groups and whites, see White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 756 (1973) (voting). Thus,
as a general rule, disproportionate impact occurs whenever official procedures relating to
selection or entitlement to benefits produce a less favorable result for a protected group.
Eisenberg, supra, at 41. See generally Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword:
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HAnv. L. Rev. 1 (1976).
The phrases "adverse impact" and "disproportionate impact" have been used inter-
changeably by the courts and the commentators in describing discriminatory effect. See B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 73 n.42 (1976). They will be so
used throughout this Note.
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tablishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination based on a
facially neutral policy having a disparate racial impact.
Constitutional challenges to facially neutral policies are gov-
erned by the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis.
2 2
In Washington, the Court held that a personnel test that disquali-
fied a disproportionately high number of black applicants did not
violate equal protection absent a showing of purposeful intent to
discriminate.2 A statistically disproportionate racial impact, the
Court found, was insufficient by itself to present a prima facie case
of unconstitutional discrimination. 4 Under this constitutional
standard, if the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of discrimi-
natory intent, the defendant must prove that its policy was not
racially motivated.
In contrast, a discriminatory effects test has emerged under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of i964. Under a classic Title VII
analysis, the plaintiff presents a prima facie case of discrimination
by showing that the defendant-employer's hiring or promotion cri-
teria have a statistically disproportionate effect on a protected
group.25 The rationale of the disproportionate impact test is that
statistical or other e mpirical evidence of racially disparate impact,
if unrebutted, will permit a legitimate inference of discriminatory
426 U.S. 229 (1976). The fourteenth amendment provides that a state shall not "deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. Although the fifth amendment has no specific equal protection provision, see U.S.
CONST. amend. V, its due process clause has been construed as containing an equal protec-
tion component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The equal protection guaran-
tees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit not only laws that overtly discrimi-
nate, but also laws that are facially neutral but have a discriminatory effect. See Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303,
306-09 (1880).
29 426 U.S. at 239. In Washington, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a
police department qualifying test that excluded 57 percent of the black applicants, but only
13 percent of the white applicants. Id. at 233. In concluding that the constitutional standard
was purposeful discrimination, the Washington Court noted that the central purpose of the
equal protection clause was to prevent official conduct that discriminates on the basis of
race. Id. at 239.
In applying the constitutional standard, the commentary and caselaw have used the
terms "intent," "motive," "motivation," and "purpose" interchangeably to mean that "the
decisionmakers desire to achieve [a particular effect] by the operation of their decision."
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. RPv. 95, 101.
" 426 U.S. at 242. The Court suggested, however, that where discriminatory effect
could not be explained on nonracial grounds, "discriminatory impact... may for all practi-
cal purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality." Id.
" E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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purpose. 2e Upon the plaintiff's prima facie showing of disparate
impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify its selection
or promotion criteria on the ground of business necessity.27 Ordi-
narily, the employer will successfully rebut the prima facie case by
proving that its criteria were job related.28 If the defendant meets
its justification burden, the burden again shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the employer's legitimate business interests
could be served by a less discriminatory selection process.29
The Conflict in the Courts
The current split of authority as to the standard governing Ti-
tle VI violations was engendered by two decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. In Lau v. Nichols,0 the Court, in approving
an HEW regulation applying an impact standard, held that a
prima facie violation of Title VI may be established by proof of
racially disproportionate adverse impact.31 The Court's subsequent
decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 2
" Fair Housing Litigation, supra note 13, at 128 n.4.
27 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Under the burden-shifting analysis of Title VII, the burden of
persuasion remains with the plaintiff; only the burden of coming forth with evidence shifts.
Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1978); see NAACP v. Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 315-16 (D. Del. 1980) (applying Sweeney rule in Title VI
case).
28 E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
29 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
30 414 U.S. 563 (1974). In Lau, the plaintiffs claimed that the failure of the San Fran-
cisco public school system to provide English language instruction to non-English speaking
students of Chinese ancestry violated Title VI by depriving them of a meaningful opportu-
nity to participate in the educational program. Id. at 564-65.
32 Id. The Court held:
Discrimination is barred.which has that effect even though no purposeful design is
present: a recipient "may not ... utilize criteria or methods of administration
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination" or have "the
effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of
the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin."
Id. at 568 (emphasis in original) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1979)).
2 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, an admissions program of the medical school of the
University of California at Davis reserved a specific number of places for disadvantaged
minority students. Id. at 269-270 (Powell, J.). The Bakke Court considered whether that
particular race-specific preference amounted to discrimination in violation of Title VI and
the Equal Protection Clause. The particular program under review was found to be constitu-
tionally impermissible, because the university could have adopted less discriminatory means
to attain its goal of a diverse student body. Id. at 315-20 (Powell, J.).
While Bakke contains dicta implicitly critical of Lau's impact test, see 438 U.S. at 350-
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however, cast doubt on the continuing validity of the Lau discrimi-
natory effects test. Examining the legislative history of the statute,
the Bakke Court cited repeated assertions by the legislators that
Title VI embodied "constitutional principles."33 The Court rea-
soned in dicta that the standard controlling Title VI violations was
identical to that applied to violations of equal protection under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.3 ' Since the constitutional stan-
dard is one of purposeful discrimination, 5 the dicta in Bakke sug-
gest that the appropriate standard under Title VI also is discrimi-
natory intent.36
Since Bakke, the circuit courts of appeal have divided as to
the standard to be applied to Title VI violations. The Ninth Cir-
53 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.), the Court did not overrule Lau. Indeed,
the question of the standard of proof necessary to establish a prima facie violation of Title
VI-addressed in Lau-was not under review in Bakke, since the university's intent to dis-
criminate was undisputed. Furthermore, there is no opinion in Bakke, including the two
opinions which argue for an intent standard, which was joined in by a majority of the Court.
While the opinion of Justice Powell and that joined in by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun (the Brennan group) favor an intent standard, they are susceptible
of more than one interpretation. Justice Powell concluded that "Title VI must be held to
proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or
the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 287 (Powell, J.). At least one court, however, has suggested
that his conclusion does not necessarily imply that an impact standard is inappropriate
under Title VI. Guardians As'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1286 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 79-7377 (2d Cir. July 25, 1980); see notes 100 & 101
and accompanying text infra. The Brennan group concluded that "as applied to the case
before us, Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself." Id. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ.). It is submitted that the fact that they confined themselves in their opinion
to "the case before us" is highly significant in evaluating the intended scope of their conclu-
sion. Such an interpretation is bolstered by other dicta in the opinion. The Brennan group
went on to note that "presumably, by analogy to our decisions construing Title VII, a medi-
cal school would not be in violation of Title VI under Lau because of the serious under-
representation of racial minorities in its student body as long as it could demonstrate that
its entrance requirements correlated sufficiently with the performance of minority students
in medical school and the medical profession." Id. at 352 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ.). The Brennan group's suggestion that the medical school would have to jus-
tify its entrance requirements, upon a mere showing of serious underrepresentation, that is
disproportionate impact, suggests that these justices, in a nonaffirmative action setting may
have held for an impact standard under Title VI.
438 U.S. at 284-87 (Powell, J.).
3 Id. at 287 (Powell, J.).
s5 See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra.
See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, No. 79-7377, slip op. at 6155 (2d Cir.
July 25, 1980); Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1980); Harris v. White, 479
F. Supp. 996, 1002 (D. Mass. 1979); Valadez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149, 159 (M.D. Fla.
1979).
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cuit has adhered to the Lau effects test8 7 In contrast, the Sixth
Circuit38 and lower federal courts in the First,39 Fifth,40 and
Tenth41 Circuits have adopted the constitutional standard *of dis-
criminatory intent suggested by the Bakke Court. Notably, the
Second Circuit has failed to endorse definitively either an intent or
an impact standard. Relying on Bakke, that court has imposed an
intent standard in Title VI challenges to school segregation 2 and
educational discrimination.'3 In the employment discrimination
context, however, the same court has employed an impact test,
analogizing to Title VII.44 Furthermore, the Second Circuit re-
3 See Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022,
1029 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1978); De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 61 & n.16 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979).
" Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 691 (6th Cir. 1979), petition for
cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1980) (No. 79-1080).
30 Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp. 996, 1002 (D. Mass. 1979).
40 Valadez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149, 159 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
41 Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist. No. 51, 470 F. Supp. 326, 330 (D. Colo.
1979).
41 Parent Ass'n v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979). Ambach was a class action
alleging that the defendant-school officials had created a de jure segregated school facility.
Id. at 708. Relying primarily on the dicta in Bakke, the Second Circuit established a pur-
poseful discrimination standard for school desegregation cases under Title VI. Id. at 715-16.
There are suggestions in Ambach, however, that its intent standard is limited to the school
desegregation context. The court noted that the powers of the courts in actions by the At-
torney General under Title IV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-8 (1976), which deals compre-
hensively with school desegregation suits, are no greater than "existing powers ... to en-
force the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 715-16; see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Ambach court concluded, therefore, that since de facto
racial imbalances could not be remedied under Title IV, Congress could not have intended
to give private plaintiffs a broader remedy under Title VI through an effects standard. 598
F.2d at 716.
43 Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1980). The Lora court considered a
claim of educational discrimination against handicapped children.
4" Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Board of
Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979). Califano was an action by a school board seeking to
enjoin the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare from declaring it ineligible for
federal assistance under the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619
(1976), due to teacher assignment disparities. 584 F.2d at 578. The court noted that employ-
ment discrimination in violation of ESAA also violated Title VI, and that a finding of dis-
crimination under Title VI could be based on disproportionate impact. Id. at 589 (citing
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974)). The court reasoned, moreover, that the constitu-
tional standard of intent should not be controlling since Congress could lawfully condition
the receipt of federal funds on the recipient's compliance with federal policies that go be-
yond constitutional requirements. 584 F.2d at 588 & n.38; see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 417 (1978) (Burger, C.J., and Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist, J.J.).
Affirming in Harris, however, the Supreme Court did not determine whether an intent or
impact test governed under Title VI. 444 U.S. at 143. But see id. at 162 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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cently declined to resolve the appropriate standard in municipal
services cases under Title VI.4 Thus, Title VI caselaw furnishes no
ultimate guidance as to the standard for violations of the statute.
The legislative history of Title VI, moreover, is equally
inconclusive.
Legislative History
The legislative history of Title VI consistently reflects Con-
gress' objective to stop the flow of federal funds to discriminatory
programs.4 6 Because Congress failed to define discrimination,4 7
however, it is unclear whether the legislature intended Title VI to
encompass programs producing discriminatory effects, as well as
those motivated by discriminatory intent. The debates suggest an
impact-oriented standard. President Kennedy, for -example, de-
clared that the function of Title VI was to prevent the expenditure
of federal funds, derived from taxpayers of all races, in a manner
which "encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial dis-
crimination. 4 8 The lawmakers further expressed the intent that
federal funds "be used to assist all Americans on an equal basis"49
and to provide them with "equal benefits without regard to the
color of their skin." 0 Morever, Senator Humphrey indicated that
Title VI's coverage extended beyond that of the Constitution, en-
compassing even situations where federal funds are used to sup-
port private segregated institutions. 51
Additional insight into congressional intent is provided by the
legislative history surrounding the Stennis Amendment to the 1972
Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA).2 ESAA provides federal
financial assistance "to meet the special needs incident to the elim-
ination of minority group segregation ... in elementary and sec-
45 Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); see note 80 infra.
46 See Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972, § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(1976); The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
4, See 110 CONG. REC. 5612 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id. at 1619 (remarks of Rep.
Abernethy); id. at 1632 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy); id. at 5251 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge);
id. at 6052 (remarks of Sen. Sparkman).
"a 109 CONG. Rc. 11161 (1963).
49 Memorandum of Views of Minority Members of the House Judiciary Committee, re-
printed in, 110 CONG. REC. 6566 (1964).
50 Id. at 6561 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
11 Id. at 6544 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
52 Emergency School Aid Act, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 701-19, 86 Stat. 354 (1972) (cur-
rent version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (Supp. H1I 1979)).
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ondary schools." s Reviewing the legislative history of the ESAA in
Board of Education v. Harris," the Supreme Court concluded that
Congress intended eligibility under ESAA to be gauged by a dis-
criminatory impact standard.5 5 By applying the Stennis Amend-
ment to Title VI cases dealing with racial discrimination in
schools, it is arguable that Congress tacitly approved the same
standard for Title VI violations.5 6
The Supreme Court, however, has apparently perceived a con-
stitutional standard of purposeful discrimination from the legisla-
tive history of Title VI. In Bakke, Justice Powell noted that the
proponents of the statute repeatedly refused to define the term
"discrimination," believing that its meaning would evolve by refer-
ence to the Constitution or other existing law.57 Justice Brennan,
after an equally exhaustive review of the statute's legislative his-
tory, likewise concluded that Congress intended Title VI to incor-
porate a constitutional standard that would develop through judi-
cial construction."
Thus, although persuasive arguments can be made for both
the constitutional intent standard and the disproportionate impact
standard, congressional intent is not clear. Moreover, the text of
" 20 U.S.C. § 3192(b) (Supp. 1I 1979).
444 U.S. 130 (1979). In Harris, a compliance investigation under Title VI revealed
that a disproportionate number of minority teachers were assigned by the defendant-school
system to schools having high minority enrollments. Id. at 134-35. Since the board of educa-
tion did not rebut or explain the statistical disparities, its applications for financial assis-
tance were denied by HEW. The board then advanced several nondiscriminatory explana-
tions for the statistical disparities, which were rejected by the lower courts as failing to
rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 137.
5 Id. at 141. Section 703 of the ESAA provides that, as a matter of federal policy, the
"guidelines and criteria" established pursuant to the statute must "be applied uniformly"
and "without regard to the origin or cause of such segregation." Justice Blackmun con-
cluded that that language suggested a standard bottomed on effect, not purpose. Id.
" Justice Stewart, in a .dissenting opinion, found the holding of the Harris majority
inconsistent with Bakke. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. at 160 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart could not understand how the majority could conclude that a disproportion-
ate impact standard was appropriate under the Stennis Amendment-intended by Congress
to be applicable to both ESAA and Title VI-when five members of the Bakke Court had
interpreted Title VI to prohibit only purposeful discrimination. Id. at 159-60 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). If Congress had in fact intended the Stennis Amendment to create a uniform
national standard proscribing action that led to disparate racial impact, Justice Stewart
found it difficult to comprehend why that standard should not also govern Title VI. Id. at
160 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The language relied on by the majority, however, in imposing
an impact test under ESAA, see note 53 and accompanying text supra, is virtually identical
to the language relating to Title VI.
57 438 U.S. at 286 (Powell, J.).
58 Id. at 339-40 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
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the statute does not prescribe a standard, and judicial interpreta-
tion is in conflict. Therefore, policy considerations assume greater
importance. This Note will examine the competing policy alterna-
tives within the framework of Bryan v. Koch.
BRYAN V. KOCH: A CASE STUDY IN MuNIcIPAL SERVICES LITIGATION
UNDER TITLE VI
The Second Circuit's decision in Bryan v. Koch illustrates the
dilemma faced by the courts in municipal services litigation: Per-
suasive arguments may be advanced, on the one hand, for respect-
ing the integrity of the municipal decisionmaking process and, on
the other hand, for permitting plaintiffs to challenge governmental
decisions having a disproportionate racial impact.
In 1979, a Health Policy Task Force appointed by the mayor
recommended that New York City could save an estimated $30
million by reducing excess capacity in its municipal hospital sys-
tem.5 19 The task force examined each of the city's 17 municipal hos-
pitals against four criteria: (1) the hospital's size, range of services
and patient caseload, (2) the quality of its plant and operations,
(3) its present and predicted fiscal viability, and (4) its proximity
to other facilities capable of serving its patients.60 Sydenham, the
smallest of the city's acute care facilities, had an average daily
caseload of only 163 patients. 1 Its physical plant was obsolete and
in need of refurbishing.62 Since its per patient costs exceeded its
Medicaid reimbursement rate by a larger margin than any other
municipal hospital, Sydenham's operating deficit was dispropor-
tionately high. 3 Finally, Sydenham was located within 30 minutes
of one municipal hospital and five voluntary hospitals capable of
absorbing its patient population." Based on these factors, the task
force recommended that the hospital be closed.6 5 The HHC
adopted this recommendation, and Sydenham was slated for clos-
ing in May of 1980.66
" Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d at 614.
60 Id. at 618.
61 Id. In 1979, the average daily in-patient caseload for Sydenham was 93, and the aver-
age daily emergency room caseload was 70. Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
Id. But see notes 70-72 and accompanying text infra.
6" 627 F.2d at 618.
" Id. at 614-15.
1980l
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The plaintiffs, however, sought a preliminary injunction,
claiming that the disproportionate racial impact resulting from the
closing of Sydenham violated Title VI unless the defendant could
establish that alternative measures having less disproportionate
impact were unavailable.67  Specifically, almost two-thirds of
Sydenham's patients were admitted through the emergency
room. 8 Thus, a patient with critical injuries "would suffer adverse
consequences if the nearest emergency room treatment available
were at even slightly more distant locations. '6 9 There was evi-
dence, moreover, that some of the surrounding voluntary hospitals
admitted a lower percentage of Medicare and Medicaid patients7
and refused admission altogether to uninsured patients.7 1 Finally,
the plaintiffs contended, the occupancy rates of nearby hospitals
were higher than reflected in the task force report, and therefore
there was no assurance that Sydenham's patient population could
be absorbed.7 2
The district court in Bryan v. Koch applied an intent standard
for prima facie violations of Title VI, requiring "at least some evi-
dence of disparate impact probative of discriminatory motive." 3
Extrapolating from Bakke and Harris, the court concluded that at
least seven justices of the Supreme Court would apply the consti-
tutional standard of discriminatory intent to violations of Title
VI. 74 The court acknowledged that the statute's implementing reg-
ulations were impact oriented 7  and that such agency interpreta-
17 See id.
Id. at 626 (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
19 Id. at 617. The type of critical injuries envisaged by the district court included gun-
shot or knife wounds and drug overdoses. Id.
10 Id. at 627-28 (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
71 Id. at 627 (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
"I Id. at 627 & n.10 (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
73 492 F. Supp. at 236; see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
11 492 F. Supp. at 232. The district court concluded that Justices White, Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, Powell, Stewart and Rehnquist would not be amenable to an impact stan-
dard under Title VI. Id.
11 Id. at 233. Numerous federal agencies have promulgated similar effect-oriented im-
plementing regulations. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.1-.143 (1980) (Dep't of Agriculture); 15
C.F.R. §§ 8.1-.15 (1980) (Dep't of Commerce); 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.13 (1980) (Dep't of Health,
Education and Welfare). See also Note, The Prima Facie Case and Remedies in Title VI
Hospital Relocation Cases, 65 Con-mu. L. Ray. 689, 691 n.9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Hospital Relocations]; Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Implementa-
tion and Impact, 36 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 824, 846-56 (1968).
The HEW regulations, for example, provide in pertinent part:
In determining the site or location of a facilities, an applicant or recipient
may not make selections with the effect of excluding individuals from, denying
[Vol. 55:124
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tions are generally entitled to deference by the courts."' It deter-
mined, however, that an agency cannot promulgate a standard that
conflicted directly with one enacted by Congress or authoritatively
endorsed by the courts.77 Moreover, the district court asserted, a
disparate impact standard, which shifts the burden of justification
to the defendant, would impinge on municipal autonomy by pro-
viding "a vehicle by which HEW (and other Title VI agencies)
could assert jurisdiction to review the merits of, and to require jus-
tification for, virtually all important decisions by federal recipi-
ents."7 8 Applying its intent-oriented standard, the court found no
violation of Title VI since the closing of Sydenham was undertaken
them the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination... or with the purpose
or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objec-
tives of the Act or this regulation.
45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(3) (1979). See also id. § (b)(1)(i)-(iv), (b)(1)(vi).
76 492 F. Supp. at 234. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S: 555, 565
(1980); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971). Where an administrative regula-
tion establishes more stringent standards than the statute appears to require, they are none-
theless valid if "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation." Mourning v.
Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973). Thus, Lau, which validated a spe-
cific HEW regulation, may be interpreted as permitting the agency administering Title VI
to impose an impact standard in their regulations, even though the language of Title VI
does not require such a standard. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974); id. at 571
(Stewart, J., concurring); Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 588-89 & n.38 (2d Cir.
1978), afi'd sub nom. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
77 492 F. Supp. at 234. Judge Sofaer suggested that the administrative regulations con-
flicted in two respects with the constitutional standard enunciated in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976). See note 23 and accompanying text supra. First, they dispensed with
the need for the agency to make a finding of intentional discrimination as a predicate for
ultimate relief. 492 F. Supp. at 234. Second, the type of evidence sufficient to establish a
prima facie case and thus shift the burden of justification to the recipient did not satisfy the
constitutional standard. Id. Judge Sofaer conceded that an impact-oriented regulation
which places the burden of justification on a recipient upon a showing by the plaintiff of
substantial disproportionate impact was within HEW's authority to protect the "integrity of
federal expenditures." Id. The test proposed by HEW was "whether there is any disparity
between (a) the proportion of minority patients who will be adversely affected, if any, as
related to all minority patients using the HHC system, and (b) a similar proportion calcu-
lated for nomninority patients." Government's Supplemental Memorandum at 7, Bryan v.
Koch, 492 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). The district court
postulated that this standard was so broad that it could require a recipient of funds derived
from any federal agency to justify reductions in any services utilized by a disproportionately
high number of minority members, even if system-wide service was increased. 492 F. Supp.
at 235. In addition, the court asserted, HEW's standards could be construed as requiring an
inquiry into all the city's budgetary options, both in the health care field and in other ser-
vice areas. Id. at 237.
78 492 F. Supp. at 235. Judge Sofaer also reasoned that to require justification for local
governmental policies would "inevitably delay or discourage many nondiscriminatory and
essential decisions." Id.
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to achieve the legitimate, racially neutral objectives of decreasing
municipal expenditures and increasing operating efficiency.79
On appeal, the Second Circuit did not reach the issue of the
standard of liability under Title VI. Instead, the court found that,
even under an effects test,8 0 the defendant had successfully coun-
tered the plaintiffs' prima facie case81 by showing that its criteria
were "reasonably related to the efficient operation of the City's
municipal hospital system" and that the selection of Sydenham for
closure was appropriate based on those criteria.82 Thus, the court
held, the plaintiffs had not demonstrated likely success on the
merits, and the lower court's denial of the preliminary injunction
was affirmed.83
The Bryan v. Koch paradigm demonstrates clearly the basic
policy considerations militating in favor of a disproportionate im-
pact standard for prima facie violations of Title VI. Four such pol-
icy considerations may be articulated. First, proof of intent may be
a difficult, if not an insurmountable, obstacle for the civil rights
plaintiff.8 4 It seems essential, therefore, that a disproportionate im-
79 Id. at 238.
80 The majority concluded that the plaintiffs had shown no likelihood of success on the
merits, even under a disproportionate impact standard, and held, therefore, that the district
court did not err in denying the preliminary injunction. 627 F.2d at 620. Thus, the court
stated that it was unnecessary for it to address the apparent conflict presented by previous
Second Circuit decisions. Id. at 616. See notes 42-44 supra. Compare Board of Educ. v.
Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 589 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S.
130 (1979) (disproportionate impact standard is appropriate under Title VI) with Lora v.
Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1980) and Parent Ass'n v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705,
715-16 (2d Cir. 1979) (intent standard appropriate under Title VI).
81 627 F.2d at 616. The majority posited several arguments, however, indicating that it
would be receptive to an impact standard if the issue were properly before it. First, Judge
Newman asserted, the Supreme Court's decision in Lau had not been overruled and had
been viewed as controlling in the Second Circuit, as well as by other circuit courts of appeal.
Id. Furthermore, since Lora involved a school desegregation case, for which Title IV, 42
U.S.C. § 2000c (1976), provides an intent standard, it need not be determinative in the
municipal services context. 627 F.2d at 616. Third, even if an intent standard governed en-
forcement proceedings seeking a cut-off remedy, such a standard may not apply in a private
action seeking an injunction. Id. Finally, the HHC had contractually bound itself to comply
with the HEW regulations imposing an effects test. Id.; see note 106 and accompanying text
infra.
82 627 F.2d at 616-20.
83 Id. at 620.
- Cf. Marquez v. Ford Motor Co., 440 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971); Gates v. Geor-
gia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Or. 1970), aff'd, 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Title ViI cases). In the wake of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), it was feared
that the constitutional standard of intent would create a formidable, if not fatal, obstacle in
constitutional challenges based on discriminatory impact. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at
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pact standard be applied under Title VI in order to preserve the
statute as an effective antidiscrimination weapon.85 Furthermore,
fairness and judicial economy require that the litigant possessing
the most probative evidence on a particular issue should bear the
burden of production on that issue.86 Since the defendant alone
was part of the decisionmaking process which resulted in the alleg-
edly discriminatory course of action, it is in the best position to
justify its decision. 7 In addition, where a municipal decision pro-
duces a disproportionate racial impact, that decision can often be
attributed to the effects of past discrimination. 8 The need to re-
dress the effects of past discrimination is a third important policy
consideration 9 and, indeed, appears to have influenced the Su-
preme Court in its landmark disproportionate impact decisions
1032 n.32. This fear appears to have been borne out by the Supreme Court's decision in
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979), in which the Court overruled, sub
silentio, a line of lower court cases holding that foreseeable segregative effects gave rise to a
presumption of segregative intent, see Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); United States v. School Dist., 565 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). See generally Note, Intent to Segregate: The
Omaha Presumption, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 775, 782 (1976). Penick held that while fore-
seeable disparate impact may be some evidence of racially discriminatory purpose, it is in-
sufficient in and of itself to establish discriminatory intent. 443 U.S. at 464; see Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979). See also Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979), wherein the Court stated that discriminatory purpose "implies more than
... intent as awareness of consequences .... It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case
a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'be-
cause of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 279.
85 See Hospital Relocations, supra note 75, at 708-09; cf. Friedman, The Burger Court
and the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1, 24 (1979) (Title VII); Note, The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault
on Private Discrimination and a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90 HARv. L. RFv. 412, 432-33
(1976) (§ i981) [hereinafter cited as Expanding Scope of § 1981]; Fair Housing Litigation,
supra note 13, at 151-52 (Title VII).
" See C. McCoRMCK, EVIDENCE § 337, at 787 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
87 See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d at 619 (2d Cir. 1980); Expanding Scope of § 1981,
supra note 85, at 432-33; Fair Housing Litigation, supra note 13, at 157-58.
" Maltz, The Expansion of the Role of the Effects Test in Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Analysis, 59 Nan. L. REv. 345, 355-56 (1980); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979). Professor Perry asserts
that poverty, poor education, and racial segregation are, to a significant extent, the result of
past discrimination. Id. at 1040.
8, Cf. Maltz, supra note 88, at 355 (loss of productivity resulting from employment of
proportionate number of minorities is cost society must bear to compensate for effects of
past discrimination). Another author has suggested that any governmental actvity that dis-
proportionately disadvantages blacks should be subject to a heavy burden of justification
because of the continuing effects of past discrimination. Perry, supra note 88, at 1078-79.
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under Title VII.O Finally, since racial discrimination tends to be
self-perpetuating, 91 disproportionate racial consequences warrant a
standard that will allow plaintiffs to avoid a directed verdict and
make a more complete showing to the court of all relevant issues.
The legislative history of Title VI and the caselaw interpreting
the statute do not preclude the application of a discriminatory ef-
fects standard for prima facie Title VI violations. The Bakke Court
interpreted Congress' failure to define discrimination as signifying
an intent that the standard evolve with that of the Constitution.2
The language in the congressional debates, however, indicating
that Title VI enacted constitutional principles9 3 and that discrimi-
nation would be defined by reference to the Constitution" does
not resolve the issue of the proper standard under the statute. As
noted in Bakke, the equal protection clause had not been applied
to public racial discrimination at the time the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was enacted. 5 Moreover, the Act preceded the Supreme
Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, which established that
the constitutional standard of discrimination was one of intent.9 It
is arguable, therefore, that Congress did not intend Title VI to
prohibit only intentional discrimination. Furthermore, this legisla-
tive reticence may equally imply that the implementing agencies
were free to formulate their own standards of discrimination. Such
a reading of the legislative history is bolstered by the fact that
Congress has not acted in the face of impact-oriented regulations"
90 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); accord, McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In Griggs, the Supreme Court stated that "[b]asic intel-
ligence must have the means of articulation to manifest itself fairly in a testing process.
Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in segregated
schools. . . ." 401 U.S. at 430. Similarly, the McDonnell Douglas Court, construing dispa-
rate treatment rather than disproportionate impact, noted the need to compensate for
"childhood deficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting from
forces beyond their control." 411 U.S. at 806.
91 Accord, Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assess-
ment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1376, 1397-99 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Discrimi-
natory Purpose]. See Rubinowitz & Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American Dream:
Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 Nw. U.L.
Rav. 491, 509-10 (1979); Fair Housing Litigation, supra note 13, at 153-57. See also Martin
Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist. Bd., 473 F.
Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
" See notes 57 & 58 and accompanying text supra.
93 See, e.g., 110 CONG. RsC. 2467 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay).
", See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
"438 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
9E.g., Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare, Appropriation Act,
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and that such agency interpretations are normally accorded defer-
ence by the courts.95
In addition, the Supreme Court's dicta in Bakke did not viti-
ate the impact test enunciated in its earlier decision in Lau. First,
the Court's apparent adoption of a discriminatory intent standard
under Title VI may have been prompted by the fact that Bakke
involved a challenge to an affirmative action program. It has been
held that the validity of such a program turns on whether it was
implemented to remedy past discrimination.99 Thus, it-seems ap-
propriate that a plaintiff challenging an affirmative action program
under Title VI should bear the stricter burden of establishing dis-
criminatory intent. It would be entirely consistent with the antidis-
crimination principles of Bakke, however, to impose a more lenient
impact standard outside the affirmative action context. Further-
more, it has been suggested that the real issue in Bakke was
whether Title VI prohibits all facially discriminatory policies per
se, or whether, like the equal protection clause, it prohibits only
those racial classifications for which there is no compelling justifi-
cation.10 0 Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that both Title VI
and the fourteenth amendment prohibit only unjustifiable racial
classifications would thus have no bearing on whether Title VI pro-
hibits practices that involve no explicit racial classification but
produce a disproportionate adverse impact on minorities.101
Finally, a recent plurality opinion of the Court, which cites
Lau with approval in support of its decision, 0 2 indicates that an
1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439, §§ 208-209, 90 Stat. 1418; see, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 623
F.2d 248, 252 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (Oakes, J., concurring). But see Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp.
212, 234 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). In Lora, Judge Oakes stated that
"Congress is well aware - if it does not like HEW administration of a given congressional
statute, or a judicial construction of it - of its right to modify that administration or con-
struction either by direct act or by an appropriation act rider." 623 F.2d at 252 n.1 (Oakes,
J., concurring).
8 See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
" Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 691 (6th Cir. 1979), petition for
cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1980) (No. 79-1080).
100 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 79-7377 (2d Cir. July 25, 1980).
101 Id.
10 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980), lends credence to the notion that Lau
may still have precedential value. In Fullilove, the Court held that the "minority business
enterprise" (MBE) provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28,
91 Stat. 116 (1977), providing that at least ten percent of any grant for local public works
projects shall, absent administrative waiver, be spent on minority business enterprises, does
not violate the equal protection clause. 100 S. Ct. at 2781-82. In addition, the Court noted
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impact standard for Title VI may be predicated on contract princi-
ples.103 All entities receiving federal financial assistance under Ti-
tle VI contractually agree to comply with the regulations promul-
gated by relevant implementing agencies. 10 4 Several of these
agencies have adopted an effects test.10 5 It appears reasonable,
therefore, to impose an impact standard based on such a contrac-
tual undertaking.106
THE IMPACT TEST IN MumcIPAL SERVICES CASES
It is suggested that a prima facie case of disproportionate im-
pact in municipal services cases under Title VI has two compo-
nents. First, the challenged governmental action must create a sub-
stantial, statistically verifiable disparity between the positions of
whites and minorities.107 Second, the disproportionate impact must
have a sufficiently adverse effect on a minority group to warrant
that the MBE provision did not violate Title VI. Id. at 2782 n.77; id. at 2794 n.15 (Powell,
J., concurring); id. at 2795 n.1 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J., con-
curring). The Court invoked Lau in support of its decision:
There are relevant similarities between the MBE program and the federal spend-
ing program reviewed in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). In Lau, a language
barrier "effectively foreclosed" non-English-speaking Chinese pupils from access
to the educational opportunities offered by the San Francisco public school sys-
tem. Id. at 564-566. It had not been shown that this had resulted from any dis-
crimination, purposeful or otherwise, or from other unlawful acts. Nevertheless,
we upheld the constitutionality of a federal regulation applicable to public school
systems receiving federal funds that prohibited the utilization of "criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect ... of defeating or substantially
impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the [educational] program as re-
spect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin."
Id. at 2775 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
103 See also Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980) (Oakes, J., concurring).
104 Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d at 616.
105 Id; see note 75 supra.
106 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980); United States v. Marion County
School Dist., 625 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1980). In Marion County, the court held that the United
States could sue to enforce contractual assurances of compliance with Title VIs prohibition
against discrimination in the operation of federally funded schools. Id. at 617.
The decision is of particular significance, since the contractual assurance explicitly
guaranteed compliance not only with Title VI, but also with the implementing regulations of
the appropriate agency. The contractual assurance in question provided that the recipient
agreed that it would:
[C]omply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352) and all re-
quirements imposed by or pursuant to the Regulation of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare issued pursuant to that title ....
Id. (citation omitted).
107 See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d at 616-17.
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shifting the burden of justification to the defendant. 08
Substantial Disproportion
Two methods for determining impermissible disparate impact
have developed under Title VII. Several federal agencies employ a
"four-fifths" rule to determine whether an employer's selection
procedures violate Title VII.L 09 Under the four-fifths rule, a prima
facie violation of the statute is made out if the rate at which mi-
norities are hired or promoted is less than four-fifths of the nonmi-
nority hiring rate." 0 Similarly, the Supreme Court has found an
actionable Title VII violation if the plaintiff proves a "substan-
tial"111 or "significant" 1 2 racial disparity in an employer's hiring or
promotion practices.113 Like the Title VII tests, the disproportion-
ate impact standard under Title VI must exclude negligible dispar-
ities which, if prohibited, might result in expensive and unwar-
ranted administrative investigations and private litigation.11 4
See id. at 617.
109 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Departments of Labor and
Justice, the Civil Service Commission, and the Office of Revenue Sharing of the Treasury
Department have jointly promulgated the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
cedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1979), which adopts the four-fifths rule. The uniform guidelines
purport to incorporate "court decisions, the previously issued guidelines of the agencies, and
the practical experience of the agencies, as well as the standards of the psychological profes-
sion." Id. § 1607.1(C). The uniform guidelines took effect on September 25, 1978 and
supercede previously issued guidelines for employee selection procedures. Id.
110 Id. § 1607.4(D).
"I See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the defendant-em-
ployer required all prospective employees either to have a high school education or to pass a
general intelligence test. Striking down these selection criteria as violative of Title VII, the
Supreme Court stated that "both requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a substan-
tially higher rate than white applicants .... " Id. at 426.
'12 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In Albemarle, the Court
held that a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII required the plaintiff to
show that "the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern
significantly different from that of the pool of applicants." Id. at 425.
11I The Supreme Court's requirement that the alleged disparity must be "substantial"
or "significant" suggests that the size of the sample must be numerically significant. See
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571-72 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Serna v. Portales Mun.
School Dist., 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1974).
114 3 A. LAxsON, EMPLOYmENT DiSCRIMInATION § 74.51 (1977); Government's Memoran-
dum of Law Discussing Standards in Title VI Actions at 23, Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612
(2d Cir. 1980). The least pronounced disparities sufficient to establish a prima facie case
under Title VII have been minority failure rates that are approximately twice those of
whites. See, e.g., United States v. Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 550 (N.D. IM. 1974). For a
comprehensive compilation of cases illustrating the degrees of disparity that have sufficed in
testing cases, see 3 A. LAmSON, supra, § 74.52. For similar compilations in the areas of educa-
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Because municipal services cases involve governmental policies and
decisions that affect individuals only incidentally, it appears that a
precise measurement, such as a four-fifths rule, is inappiopriate. 115
Thus, a more flexible approach based on a case-by-case determina-
tion of substantiality should apply.
It appears that a singular inquiry into the extent of the alleged
disproportionate impact is insufficient in municipal services litiga-
tion under Title VI. In the employment situations governed by Ti-
tle VII, a violation of the statute will invariably produce a result
that is adverse, as well as disproportionate-the plaintiff will be
foreclosed from opportunities for employment or advancement. In
contrast, in the context of municipal services, several factors may
mitigate the adversity of the result.""6 While the impact of a mu-
nicipal decision may be disproportionate, its overall effect may be
inconsequential. Therefore, in municipal services cases, dispropor-
tionate impact will not be sufficiently adverse unless the plaintiffs
have been "effectively foreclosed" from access to adequate public
services.'17
Under this two-fold inquiry, it is clear that the plaintiffs in
Bryan v. Koch established a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion requirements, arrest records, wage garnishment, and height and weight requirements,
see id. §§ 74.53-.57.
115 Interestingly, during the Bryan v. Koch litigation, HEW considered adopting the
four-fifths rule as its official policy for analyzing the impact on minority patients of hospital
closures and reductions. Government's Memorandum of Law Discussing Standards in Title
VI Actions at 23, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.
1980).
"' For example, alternative facilities or procedures may ameliorate the disproportion-
ate impact. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d at 617 & n.2.
117 See Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979). In Jackson, city officials
proposed to close the acute in-patient and emergency room facilities at one hospital and
consolidate those services with another hospital. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunc-
tion alleging, inter alia, that the plan violated Title VI. Id. at 898-99. In determining
whether plaintiffs had demonstrated a sufficient probability of success on the merits to jus-
tify a preliminary injunction, the court held that they had failed to show that the consolida-
tion of services would result in their being effectively foreclosed from hospital services. Id.
at 904. The court traced this "effective foreclosure" standard to Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974), where the Supreme Court held that the failure of the San Francisco school system to
provide English language instruction to Chinese students violated Title VI by effectively
foreclosing them from participating in the educational program. 476 F. Supp. at 904; see
notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra. See also Larry P. v. Riles, 48 U.S.L.W. 2298
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979), wherein the court held that public school placement policies re-
sulting in a grossly disproportionate overenrollment of black children in special classes for
the educable mentally retarded violated Title VI since they effectively foreclosed the chil-
dren from any meaningful education.
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tion under Title VI. Statistical disparity was satisfied by proof that
Sydenham Hospital's patient population was 98% minority, while
only 66% of the patients served by the municipal hospital system
as a whole were members of minority groups.'1 8 In addition, the
plaintiffs met the "effective foreclosure" standard by demonstrat-
ing that surrounding hospitals were either unable or unwilling to
provide easily accessible emergency facilities to meet the needs of
the community." 9
The Defendant's Burden of Justification
Under a traditional Title VII analysis, the defendant may re-
fute the plaintiff's prima facie showing of disproportionate impact
with proof of a nondiscriminatory justification. 20 Successful rebut-
tal by the defendant under Title VI may be measured by three
different standards.
Under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,21 the defen-
dant sustains its burden of justification if it establishes a compel-
ling governmental interest. In United States v. City of Black
Jack, 22 the Eighth Circuit formulated a three-stage analysis for
ascertaining whether the asserted governmental interest met this
standard.123 The Black Jack test requires a defendant-municipal-
ity to show that its ordinance advances a public interest; that the
governmental interest served by the ordinance is lawful and sub-
stantial enough to outweigh the plaintiff's private detriment; and
that the government's purpose could not be attained by less drastic
means.
24
In contrast, the Second Circuit in Bryan v. Koch proposed hy-
118 627 F.2d at 617k
11 Id. at 626-27 (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
,20 See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
121 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1976).
122 508 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). In Black Jack, the
defendant-city passed a zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction of multiple family
dwellings, shortly after the Department of Housing and Urban Development had approved a
federally subsidized low-to-moderate income townhouse development at a site within the
city. 508 F.2d at 1182-83.
123 Interestingly, although Black Jack involved Title VIRI violations by a municipality,
the Eighth Circuit did not consider whether its compelling interest standard constituted a
judicial usurpation of municipal prerogative. The court merely found that the city had not
demonstrated that any of its asserted interests were furthered by the zoning ordinance. 508
F.2d at 1187.
124 Id. at 1186-87.
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pothetically a "rational relationship" standard at the rebuttal
stage. Its inquiry was two tiered. First, the municipality must
demonstrate that its criteria reasonably effectuated legitimate gov-
ernmental objectives.'25 Then, it must show that, based on those
criteria, its decision was justified. 12 6
Recent equal protection decisions by the Supreme Court sug-
gest that the court in a Title VI case may also entertain a balanc-
ing of the equities at the rebuttal stage. 27 Under a balancing ap-
proach, the defendant sustains its burden of justification by
proving that the importance of its governmental objectives out-
weighs the racially disproportionate impact resulting from the
challenged policy. 128 The elements of the defendant's rebuttal may
include a consistent adherence by the municipality to neutral poli-
cies, a lack of alternative courses of action, regularity in the proce-
dures leading to the challenged decision, and an absence of past
discrimination against the plaintiffs. 29
225 Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d at 617.
128 Id. at 617-18. The Second Circuit noted that a legitimate public purpose would not
justify the city's decision because it had chosen to close 1 of 17 municipal hospitals. In
holding instead that the city's choice must be reasonably related to a legitimate objective,
id. at 618, the court analogized to Title VIL In a Title VII suit, "an employment test with a
disparate racial impact could not be justified . . . simply because it selected some employ-
ees; there would have to be a showing that the particular test chosen by the employer was a
useful selector of employees qualified for the particular job." Id. at 618 n.3.
'17 Discriminatory Purpose, supra note 91, at 1409 (1979); see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 449 (1979). See also United States v. City of Black Jack, 508
F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (in Title VIII case, if defendant
establishes compelling governmental interest, that interest is balanced against housing op-
portunities foreclosed); Comment, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect Under the Fair Hous-
ing Act: A Search for the Proper Standard, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 398, 417 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Justifying Discriminatory Effect]. Even under a constitutional analysis, the court
may weigh the extent of the disproportionate impact against the importance of the govern-
ment's legitimate objectives in order to assess the likelihood that only neutral factors con-
tributed to the decision. Discriminatory Purpose, supra note 91, at 1408.
28 Discriminatory Purpose, supra note 91, at 1408. One author has suggested that
under a balancing test, the court must weigh the following factors:
(1) the degree of disproportion in the impact; (2) the private interest disadvan-
taged; (3) the efficiency of the challenged law in achieving its objective and the
availability of alternative means having a less disproportionate impact; and (4) the
governmental objective sought to be advanced.
Perry, supra note 21, at 559-60.
"I Discriminatory Purpose, supra note 91, at 1410, 1412 (1979). A fourth possible stan-
dard, imposing a variable burden of justification, has been suggested for actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). See Note, Section 1981: Discriminatory Purpose or Disproportionate
Impact?, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 137, 167-69 (1980). Under this test, where the degree of harm
caused by the disproportionate impact is high, the defendant must demonstrate that its
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At first blush, it appears that the balancing approach is partic-
ularly suited to municipal services cases under Title VI. A balanc-
ing test not only accommodates many policy considerations that
enter into the municipal decisionmaking process,3 o but also ac-
knowledges that many facially neutral policies having a dispropor-
tionate racial impact may nonetheless serve important societal in-
terests.13' Additionally, since the interests of the parties under a
disproportionate impact analysis are, to an extent, measurable, a
balancing process is more feasible. 32 Upon closer reflection, how-
ever, it becomes apparent that the balancing approach merely en-
tails an examination of the extent of the disproportionate impact
and the availability of alternatives. 33 This Note has suggested that
such an inquiry into the degree of the disparate impact is better
undertaken in determining whether the plaintiff has made out a
action bears a "substantial and immediate relation to neutral ends." Id. at 168 n.195. Where
the degree of harm is low, however, the defendant must merely demonstrate that its prac-
tices "reasonably advance neutral ends." Id. at 168. In assessing the extent of harm caused
by disproportionate impact, the following factors would be important: the degree of dispro-
portionate impact; the total number of individuals adversely affected by a decision; the exis-
tence of other procedures in the same area having a detrimental effect on the minority
group in question; and whether that group suffers from the effects of past discrimination.
Id. at 169. In determining whether a facially neutral procedure advances a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest, the following factors are paramount: whether, and to what extent, im-
portant social ends are served by the decision; the availability of alternative courses of ac-
tion that would serve the defendant's objectives without producing a disproportionate racial
impact; and whether the disproportionate impact was foreseeable. Id.
It is submitted that such a variable standard is inappropriate in municipal services
cases under Title VI. Under the stringent "substantial and immediate relation" standard, it
is less likely that the municipality will be able to successfully rebut the plaintiff's prima
facie case. Thus, the plaintiff may prevail merely upon a showing of substantial dispropor-
tionate impact, without having to establish that alternative courses of action were available
to the defendant to effectuate its purposes. In municipal services cases, where the defendant
must make difficult political and fiscal decisions, the plaintiff should not be able to prevail
on such a narrow showing.
130 See notes 84-91 and accompanying text supra.
131 E.g., Towns v. Beame, 386 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Towns, the court re-
viewed a municipality's decision to close fire companies in certain areas of New York City.
Id. at 471. Seven of the eight areas affected were inhabited predominantly by minorities. Id.
at 472-73. This disparate impact was held to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional
discrimination. Id. at 473. The court concluded, however, that the defendant city had suc-
cessfully rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie case by showing that its objective was to max-
imize fire protection, and thereby minimize loss of life, throughout the entire city. Id. at 475.
132 Justifying Discriminatory Effect, supra note 127, at 419-24. On the other hand, a
factor such as intent is incapable of being quantified, and therefore does not lend itself to a
balancing analysis. Id. at 423.
"I See notes 127-29 and accompanying text supra.
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prima facie case. 34 Furthermore, alternative courses of action are
more properly advanced by the plaintiff to counter the defendant's
showing of justification." 5 Thus, it appears that some absolute, as
opposed to balancing, standard of justification should govern. 13 6
As an absolute standard, the Black Jack compelling interest
test may work a disservice in municipal services litigation. Because
proof of a "compelling interest" is a heavy burden of justification,
it decreases the likelihood that a defendant-municipality will be
able to successfully rebut the plaintiff's prima facie showing of dis-
parate impact. As a result, governmental decisions that serve legiti-
mate and beneficial social ends may be invalidated merely upon
proof of racially disproportionate effects. 3 7 Thus, the compelling
interest burden of justification appears better reserved for consti-
tutional analyses of facially discriminatory governmental action.
The burden of justification proposed by the Second Circuit in
Bryan v. Koch will permit the most equitable and comprehensive
consideration of all pertinent issues in municipal services cases. 38
Analogous to the burden of employers under Title VII to prove
job-relatedness,3 " the rational relationship standard ensures that
the plaintiff will not prevail merely upon a showing of disparate
impact. Municipalities, as a result, will not be deterred from
adopting or implementing fiscally prudent and potentially benefi-
cial policies. And, as under Title VII, the plaintiff will still have
the opportunity to demonstrate that an alternative, less discrimi-
natory policy would equally effectuate the municipality's legiti-
mate objectives.
As the Second Circuit concluded in Bryan v. Koch, the city
sustained its burden of proving a rational relationship. 40 The clos-
ing of Sydenham was based on legitimate and articulable crite-
ria.' 4 ' Those criteria, moreover, reasonably advanced the neutral
ends of economy and efficiency in the provision of municipal
"' See notes 109-15 and accompanying text supra.
"3 See text at 151 infra.
"I Under an "absolute" approach, once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case,
the court considers only "the defendant's interest, which it measures against a fixed stan-
dard, rather than against the plaintiff's countervailing interest."
137 See Towns v. Beame, 386 F. Supp. 470, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Perry, supra note 21,
at 559-60.
38 See text accompanying notes 125-26 supra.
139 See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
140 See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d at 620.





The most telling analysis in Bryan v. Koch involved the extent
to which a court should scrutinize and evaluate alternative meth-
ods by which the defendant could attain its objectives without pro-
ducing a disproportionate racial impact. The plaintiffs urged the
court to consider a broad range of alternatives whereby the city's
fiscal resources could be preserved in a less discriminatory man-
ner. 142 A majority of the Second Circuit panel recognized that the
HEW regulations required a consideration of alternatives and that
the courts had entertained such an inquiry in cases under Title
VI,1 43 Title VII,1 4 and Title VIII. 114 5 While the court noted that a
narrow inquiry into alternatives, analogous to that undertaken
under Title VII,148 would be appropriate in Title VI cases, it re-
jected the broad examination of alternatives proposed by the
plaintiffs. Such a broad inquiry, the court held, would abridge mu-
nicipal discretion and substitute the judgment of the courts for
that of the municipality in areas of competing political and eco-
nomic alternatives. 47 Moreover, the majority asserted, such judi-
cial policymaking would be carried on without the participation of
the city's elected officials and appointed specialists and, thus, with-
142 627 F.2d at 618. The alternative measures proposed by the Bryan v. Koch plaintiffs
included "hospital mergers, regionalization of services, increasing Sydenham's services to
reduce its deficit, and increasing Medicaid reimbursement." Id. In rejecting the plaintiffs'
proposals, Judge Newman noted that, at the time of the enactment of Title VI, most civil
rights litigation was directed at facilities that either excluded minorities or admitted them
on a "separate-but-equal" basis. Id. at 618. Therefore, the majority contended, it was un-
likely that Congress anticipated that the statute would be used to challenge a local adminis-
trative decision to close a municipal facility. Id.
143 627 F.2d at 618-19; see NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp.
290, 343-45 (D. Del. 1980).
14 627 F.2d at 618-19; e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
14 627 F.2d at 618-19; e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
146 627 F.2d at 619. In a Title VII case, the court will not consider such broad alterna-
tives as hiring additional employees or changing the method of production. Id. Instead, the
Title VII defendant must merely show that its employment test was a useful selector of
employees qualified for the particular job. Id.; see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 433-36 (1971).
1 627 F.2d at 619. In addition, the court reasoned that there was no assurance that the
alternative chosen would ultimately result in a greater benefit to the minority population.
Id.
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out the sanction of the electorate.' 48
In contrast, the dissent suggested that a broad examination of
alternatives should be part of the defendant's burden of justifica-
tion in municipal services cases. According to the dissent's two-
tiered test, a court first would determine whether the challenged
decision had been reached in a rational manner.'49 A rational deci-
sionmaking process, in turn, would entail "consideration of appro-
priate alternatives in the light of a factual assessment of these al-
ternatives.' 50 If the decisionmaking process were found to be
rational, the court would assess the substantive merits of the deci-
sion. ' A comparable burden of establishing alternatives as part of
a defendant's justification has been adopted by other federal
courts at the trial and appellate levels.8 2
148 Id.
"I Id. at 623. (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
11 Id. (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Kearse stated, however,
that the court should assess only the alternative "measures that might have been taken"
within the HHC, and not the city's entire range of budgetary options. Id. at 625. (Kearse, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
"I! Id. at 623 (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Applying its two-tiered
burden of justification, the dissent found that the range of alternatives considered by the
city in selecting Sydenham for closure was unreasonably narrow. Id. at 624 (Kearse, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part). The city had failed to evaluate the possibilities of merg-
ing hospitals or regionalizing services. Evidence was adduced at trial tending to show that
such an evaluation could have been completed in three weeks. Furthermore, the city's deci-
sion was based on insufficient information as to the actual effects of the closing and on
outdated and inappropriate statistics regarding the capacity of nearby hospitals. Id. at 625-
27 (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). According to the dissent, these lapses
constituted a serious defect in the decisionmaking process. Id. at 625 (Kearse, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
"2 See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 908 (1978); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 316 (D.
Del. 1980). In Rizzo, the court found a violation of Title VIII, resulting from the discrimina-
tory effect of the actions of city officials and agencies, which hindered construction of a low-
income housing project for blacks. 564 F.2d at 129-30. The court held that "a justification
must serve, in theory and practice, a legitimate, bona fide interest of the Title VIII defen-
dant, and the defendant must show that no alternative course of action could be adopted
that would enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory impact." 564 F.2d at
149. The Rizzo decision is of particular significance because its disproportionate impact
standard was explicitly adopted recently in a municipal services case involving the reloca-
tion of a hospital. See NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 315-16
(D. Del. 1980). The Rizzo standard was deemed particularly appropriate in that case be-
cause of the similarities between a housing location decision and a hospital site determina-
tion. Id. at 315. In applying the Rizzo standard, the court narrowly construed the defen-
dant's burden of demonstrating a lack of adequate, less discriminatory alternatives to mean
that he must show how his legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest justified the rejection of
alternative hospital sites. Id. at 316. This narrow consideration of alternative sites parallels
the Second Circuit's approach in Bryan v. Koch, where the court required that the defen-
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The arguments raised by the Bryan v. Koch majority in favor
of a narrow approach to alternatives are persuasive. It appears,
however, that a broad examination of alternatives would, as sug-
gested by the dissent, better serve the purposes of municipal ser-
vices litigation under Title VI. Several policy considerations sup-
port this approach. The fiscal inviability of health care institutions,
for example, may partially be due to an inequitable, discriminatory
allocation of municipal resources in the past. In addition, munici-
pal institutions serving minority neighborhoods may be unprofita-
ble in part because of the economic privation of the community
that it serves. Thus, the effects of past discrimination may contrib-
ute to decisions to close or relocate municipal health care facilities.
For this reason, a more comprehensive consideration of alterna-
tives should be undertaken.
The antimajoritarian nature of an extensive inquiry into alter-
natives, however, requires that the plaintiff bear the burden of
showing less discriminatory means of furthering the municipality's
legitimate objectives. Moreover, by virtue of his claim, the Title VI
plaintiff implicitly suggests that feasible, less discriminatory op-
tions exist. Additionally, if the onus was placed on the defendant
to demonstrate the absence of less discriminatory alternatives, the
defendant-municipality would be required to prove a negative.
Therefore, an affirmative showing by the plaintiff of less discrimi-
natory options is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
In light of the uncertainty engendered by the Supreme Court's
decision in Bakke over the appropriate standard for a prima facie
case under Title VI, the circuits are currently in conflict as to
whether an intent standard or an impact standard is to apply. In
the context of municipal services litigation under Title VI, this
Note has examined the tension between the municipality's need to
determine its own budgetary priorities free of judicial interference,
dant justify the choice of a particular hospital. 627 F.2d at 617-18. The Wilmington court,
however, included a surrebuttal element whereby the plaintiff may show that "the needs
asserted are only pretexts or that some less discriminatory alternative would meet those
needs as well or better than the challenged action." 491 F. Supp. at 316 (footnote omitted).
Thus, at first blush, the standard espoused by that court is very similar to that advocated in
this Note. The important difference lies in the consideration of alternatives - the Wilming-
ton court favored a narrow demonstration of a lack of available alternatives, less discrimina-
tory sites, whereas this Note has advocated a broader consideration of alternatives.
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and the minority resident's right to question a municipality's deci-
sions impacting disproportionately upon him. This Note has ar-
gued that while judicial authority is in conflict, compelling policy
considerations militate in favor of a disproportionate impact
standard.
A recent Second Circuit decision, Bryan v. Koch, articulated
one possible disproportionate impact standard that this Note has
examined with approval. Under this standard, a prima facie case of
disproportionate impact would be established by two elements:
first, a disparity between the positions of whites and minorities
that is unfavorable to the latter; and second, an adverse impact
upon the minority group significant enough to warrant a shift of
the burden of justification to the defendant. Following the estab-
lishment of a prima facie case, the burden of justification would
shift to the defendant to demonstrate that the decision sought to
achieve legitimate objectives and that the criteria used by the de-
fendant to achieve these legitimate objectives are reasonably re-
lated to their accomplishment.
Although the Second Circuit rejected a broad inquiry into al-
ternatives having less discriminatory impact, this Note has sug-
gested that policy considerations require such an inquiry. Thus, if
the defendant is able to meet his initial burden of justification, the
plaintiff may then establish that other equally feasible, less dis-
criminatory options were available to the defendant. The defen-
dant would then have the opportunity to explain why these alter-
natives were not appropriate.
The relatively lenient initial burdens of the parties accommo-
date the interests of both sides by ensuring that the plaintiff is not
foreclosed from judicial relief without an adequate opportunity to
present his case. Also, in order that the case may not summarily be
terminated in the plaintiff's favor, the defendant's burden of justi-
fication is not unduly stringent. It is suggested that such an alloca-
tion of the parties' burdens is necessary to preserve the utility of
Title VI as an effective weapon against discrimination without un-
duly infringing on the fiscal autonomy of municipalities.
John C. McBride
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